Abstract
Introduction
We consider concurrent reachability games played by two players on finite state spaces. The configuration of such a game is called a state. At each round, the two players choose their moves concurrently and independently; the two moves and the current state determine a successor state, or in general, a probability distribution over the successor states. A play of the game consists in the infinite sequence of states visited while playing the game. The objective of player 1 consists in forcing the game to a specified set of target states; the objective of player 2 consists in preventing the game from reaching a target state. Consequently, we assign value 1 to all plays that reach the target set, and value 0 to all other plays. The players can adopt strategies that are both randomized and history-dependent. Player 1 can guarantee a value v for the game from a state s if player 1 has a strategy that ensures that the expected value of a play from s is at least v, regardless of the strategy chosen by player 2. The value at state s of the reachability game with target T is the supremum of the set of values that player 1 can guarantee from s. An optimal strategy for player 1 is a strategy that guarantees the value of the game from each state s. For ε > 0, an ε-optimal strategy for player 1 is a strategy that guarantees that the objective is satisfied with a probability within ε of the value of the game, for each state s.
Concurrent reachability games belong to the family of repeated games [17, 13] , and they have been studied more specifically in [9, 8, 10] . In this paper our contributions are two-fold. First, we present a simple and combinatorial proof of the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies for concurrent games with reachability objectives, for all ε > 0. Second, we present a strategy-improvement (a.k.a. policy-iteration) algorithm for concurrent reachability games. Unlike in the special case of turn-based games, where at every state at most one player can choose between multiple moves, the algorithm need not terminate in finitely many iterations. Strategy improvement algorithms were previously known for turn-based games with reachability objectives [5] , and turn-based games with more complex objectives [18, 2] .
It has long been known that optimal strategies need not exist for concurrent reachability games [13] , so that one must settle for ε-optimality. It was also known that, for ε > 0, there exist ε-optimal strategies that are memoryless, i.e., strategies that always choose a probability distribution over moves that depends only on the current state, and not on the past history of the play [14] . Unfortunately, the only previous proof of this fact is rather complex. The proof considered discounted versions of reachability games, where a play that reaches the target in k steps is assigned a value of α k , for some discount factor 0 < α ≤ 1, rather than value 1. It is possible to show that, for 0 < α < 1, memoryless optimal strategies always exist. The result for the undiscounted (α = 1) case followed from an analysis of the limit behavior of such optimal strategies for α → 1. The limit behavior is studied with the help of results on the field of real Puisieux series [14] . This proof idea works not only for reachability games, but also for total-reward games with nonnegative rewards (see [14] again). A more specialized recent result [12] established the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies for certain infinite-state (recursive) concurrent games, but again the proof relies on deep results from analysis and linear algebra (matrix theory). We show that the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies for concurrent reachability games can be established by more elementary means. Our proof relies only on combinatorial techniques and on simple properties of Markov decision processes [1, 7] . As our proof is easily accessible, we believe that the proof techniques we use will find future applications in game theory.
Our proof of the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies, for all ε > 0, is built upon a value-iteration scheme that converges to the value of the game [10] . The value-iteration scheme computes a sequence u 0 , u 1 , u 2 , . . . of valuations, where for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . each valuation u i associates with each state s of the game a lower bound u i (s) on the value of the game, such that lim i→∞ u i (s) converges to the value of the game at s. From each valuation u i , we can easily extract a memoryless, randomized player-1 strategy, by considering the (randomized) choice of moves for player 1 that achieves the maximal one-step expectation of u i . In general, a strategy π i obtained in this fashion is not guaranteed to achieve the value u i . We show that π i is guaranteed to achieve the value u i if it is proper, that is, if regardless of the strategy adopted by player 2, the game reaches with probability 1 states that are either in the target, or that have no path leading to the target. Next, we show how to extract from the sequence of valuations u 0 , u 1 , u 2 , . . . a sequence of memoryless randomized player-1 strategies π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . that are guaranteed to be proper, and thus achieve the values u 0 , u 1 , u 2 , . . .. This proves the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies for all ε > 0.
We then apply the techniques developed for the above proof to develop a strategy-improvement algorithm for concurrent reachability games. Strategy-improvement algorithms, also known as policy iteration algorithms in the context of Markov decision processes [11, 1] , compute a sequence of memoryless strategies π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . such that, for all k ≥ 0, (i) the strategy π k+1 is at all states no worse than π k ; (ii) if π k+1 = π k , then π k is optimal; and (iii) for every ε > 0, we can find a k sufficiently large so that π k is ε-optimal. Computing a sequence of strategies π 0 , π 1 , π 2 , . . . on the basis the value-iteration scheme from above does not yield a strategy-improvement algorithm, as condition (ii) may be violated: there is no guarantee that a step in the value iteration leads to an improvement in the strategy. We will show that the key to obtain a strategy-improvement algorithm consists in recomputing, at each iteration, the values of the player-1 strategy to be improved, and in adopting a particular strategy-update rule, which ensures that all the strategies produced are proper. Unlike previous proofs of strategy-improvement algorithms for concurrent games [5, 14] , which relied on the analysis of discounted versions of the games, our analysis is again purely combinatorial. Differently from turn-based games [5] , for concurrent games we cannot guarantee the termination of the strategyimprovement algorithm. In fact, there are games where optimal strategies do not exist, and we can guarantee the existence of only ε-optimal strategies, for all ε > 0 [13, 9] .
Definitions
Notation. For a countable set A, a probability distribution on A is a function δ : A → [0, 1] such that a∈A δ(a) = 1. We denote the set of probability distributions on A by
δ consists of the following components:
• A finite state space S and a finite set M of moves.
• Two move assignments • A probabilistic transition function δ : 
We denote by Ω the set of all plays, and by Ω s the set of all plays ω = s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . such that s 0 = s, that is, the set of plays starting from state s.
Selectors and strategies. A selector ξ for player i ∈ {1, 2} is a function ξ : S → D(M ) such that for all states s ∈ S and moves a ∈ M , if ξ(s)(a) > 0, then a ∈ Γ i (s). We denote by Λ i the set of all selectors for player i ∈ {1, 2}. The selector ξ is pure if for every state s ∈ S, there is a move a ∈ M such that ξ(s)(a) = 1. A strategy for player i ∈ {1, 2} is a function π : S + → D(M ) that associates with every finite, nonempty sequence of states, representing the history of the play so far, a selector for player i; that is, for all w ∈ S * and s ∈ S, we have Supp(π(w · s)) ⊆ Γ i (s). The strategy π is pure if it always chooses a pure selector; that is, for all w ∈ S + , there is a move a ∈ M such that π(w)(a) = 1. A memoryless strategy is independent of the history of the play and depends only on the current state. Memoryless strategies correspond to selectors; we write ξ for the memoryless strategy consisting in playing forever the selector ξ. A strategy is pure memoryless if it is both pure and memoryless. We denote by Π 1 and Π 2 the sets of all strategies for player 1 and player 2, respectively.
Destinations of moves and selectors. For all states s ∈ S
and moves a 1 ∈ Γ 1 (s) and a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s), we indicate by Dest(s, a 1 , a 2 ) = Supp(δ(s, a 1 , a 2 )) the set of possible successors of s when the moves a 1 and a 2 are chosen. Given a state s, and selectors ξ 1 and ξ 2 for the two players, we denote by
the set of possible successors of s with respect to the selectors ξ 1 and ξ 2 .
Once a starting state s and strategies π 1 and π 2 for the two players are fixed, the game is reduced to an ordinary stochastic process. Hence, the probabilities of events are uniquely defined, where an event A ⊆ Ω s is a measurable set of plays. For an event A ⊆ Ω s , we denote by Pr π1,π2 s (A) the probability that a play belongs to A when the game starts from s and the players follows the strategies π 1 and π 2 . Similarly, for a measurable function f : Ω s → IR, we denote by E π1,π2 s (f ) the expected value of f when the game starts from s and the players follow the strategies π 1 and π 2 . For i ≥ 0, we denote by Θ i : Ω → S the random variable denoting the i-th state along a play. 
Valuations. A valuation is a mapping
Given a valuation v, and two selectors ξ 1 ∈ Λ 1 and ξ 2 ∈ Λ 2 , we define the valuations P re ξ1,ξ2 (v), P re 1:ξ1 (v), and P re 1 (v) as follows, for all states s ∈ S:
Intuitively, P re 1 (v)(s) is the greatest expectation of v that player 1 can guarantee at a successor state of s. Also note that given a valuation v, the computation of P re 1 (v) reduces to the solution of a zero-sum one-shot matrix game, and can be solved by linear programming. Similarly, P re 1:ξ1 (v)(s) is the greatest expectation of v that player 1 can guarantee at a successor state of s by playing the selector ξ 1 . Note that all of these operators on valuations are monotonic: for two valuations v, w, if v ≤ w, then for all selectors ξ 1 ∈ Λ 1 and ξ 2 ∈ Λ 2 , we have P re ξ1,ξ2 (v) ≤ P re ξ1,ξ2 (w), P re 1:ξ1 (v) ≤ P re 1:ξ1 (w), and P re 1 (v) ≤ P re 1 (w).
Reachability and safety objectives. Given a subset T ⊆ S of target states, the objective of a reachability game consists in reaching T . Therefore, we define the set winning plays as the set Reach(
the set Reach(T ) is measurable. The probability of reaching T from a state s ∈ S under strategies π 1 and π 2 for players 1 and 2, respectively, is Pr π1,π2 s (Reach(T )). We define the value for player 1 of the reachability game with target T from the state s ∈ S as
Given a player-1 strategy π 1 , we use the notation
A strategy π 1 for player 1 is optimal if for all states s ∈ S, we have
For ε > 0, a strategy π 1 for player 1 is ε-optimal if for all states s ∈ S, we have
Given a set F ⊆ S of safe states, the objective of a safety game consists in never leaving F . Correspondingly, the set of winning plays is Safe(
For all F ⊆ S, the set Safe(F ) is measurable. We define the value for player 2 of the safety game with objective Safe(S \ T ) at the state s ∈ S as Reachability and safety objectives are dual, i.e., we have Reach(T ) = Ω \ Safe(S \ T ). The quantitative determinacy result of [16] ensures that for all states s ∈ S, we have 1 (Reach(T ))(s) + 2 (Safe(S \ T ))(s) = 1.
Markov Decision Processes
To develop our arguments, we need some facts about oneplayer versions of concurrent stochastic games, known as Markov decision processes (MDPs) [11, 1] . For i ∈ {1, 2}, a player-i MDP (for short, i-MDP) is a concurrent game where, for all states s ∈ S, we have |Γ 3−i (s)| = 1. Given a concurrent game G, if we fix a memoryless strategy corresponding to selector ξ 1 for player 1, the game is equivalent to a 2-MDP G ξ1 with the transition function
for all s ∈ S and a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s). Similarly, if we fix selectors ξ 1 and ξ 2 for both players in a concurrent game G, we obtain a Markov chain, which we denote by G ξ1,ξ2 .
End components. In an MDP, the sets of states that play an equivalent role to the closed recurrent classes of Markov chains [15] are called "end components" [6, 7] . , where E consists of the transitions that occur with nonzero probability when moves in M i (·) are chosen by player i, is strongly connected.
Definition 2 (End components)
Given a play ω ∈ Ω, we denote by Inf(ω) the set of states that occurs infinitely often along ω. Given a set F ⊆ 2 S of subsets of states, we denote by Inf(F ) the event {ω | Inf(ω) ∈ F}. The following theorem states that in a 2-MDP, for every strategy of player 2, the set of states that are visited infinitely often is, with probability 1, an end component. Corollary 1 follows easily from Theorem 1. MDPs with reachability objectives. Given a 2-MDP with a reachability objective Reach(T ) for player 2, where T ⊆ S, the values can be obtained as the solution of a linear program [14] . The linear program has a variable x(s) for all states s ∈ S, and the objective function and the constraints are as follows:
The correctness of the above linear program to compute the values follows from [11, 14] .
Existence of Memoryless ε-Optimal Strategies for Concurrent Reachability Games
In this section we present an elementary proof of the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies for concurrent reachability games, for all ε > 0 (optimal strategies need not exist for concurrent games with reachability objectives [13] ). A proof of the existence of memoryless optimal strategies for safety games can be found in [10] .
From value iteration to selectors
Consider a reachability game with target T ⊆ S. Let W 2 = {s ∈ S | 1 (Reach(T ))(s) = 0} be the set of states from which player 1 cannot reach the target with positive probability. From [8] , we know that this set can be computed as
The limit is reached in at most |S| iterations. Note that player 2 has a strategy that confines the game to W 2 , and that consequently all strategies are optimal for player 1, as they realize the value 0 of the game in W 2 . Therefore, without loss of generality, in the remainder we assume that all states in W 2 and T are absorbing. Our first step towards proving the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies for reachability games consists in considering a value-iteration scheme for the computation of
(Reach(T )). Let [T ] : S → [0, 1] be the indicator function of T , defined by [T ](s) = for s ∈ T , and [T ](s) = 0 for s ∈ T . Let u 0 = [T ]
, and for all k ≥ 0, let
Note that the classical equation assigns u k+1 = [T ] ∨ P re 1 (u k ), where ∨ is interpreted as the maximum in pointwise fashion. Since we assume that all states in T are absorbing, the classical equation reduces to the simpler equation given by (1) . From the monotonicity of P re 1 it follows
The result of [10] establishes by a combinatorial argument that 1 (Reach(T )) = lim k→∞ u k , where the limit is interpreted in pointwise fashion. For all k ≥ 0, let the player-1 selector ζ k be a value-optimal selector for u k , that is, a selector such that P re 1 (u k ) = P re 1:ζ k (u k ). An ε-optimal strategy π k 1 for player 1 can be constructed by applying the sequence ζ k , ζ k−1 , . . . , ζ 1 , ζ 0 , ζ 0 , ζ 0 , . . . of selectors, where the last selector, ζ 0 , is repeated forever. It is possible to prove by induction on k that
As the strategies π In the example, the problem is that the strategy ξ 1 may cause player 1 to stay forever in S \ (T ∪ W 2 ) with positive probability. We call "proper" the strategies of player 1 that guarantee reaching T ∪ W 2 with probability 1. We note that proper strategies are closely related to Condon's notion of a halting game [4] : precisely, a game is halting iff all player-1 strategies are proper. We can check whether a selector for player 1 is proper by considering only the pure selectors for player 2.
Definition 3 (Proper strategies and selectors)
Lemma 1 Given a selector ξ 1 for player 1, the memoryless player-1 strategy ξ 1 is proper iff for every pure selector ξ 2 for player 2, and for all states s ∈ S, we have Pr
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Given a player-1 selector ξ 1 , consider the 2-MDP G ξ1 . If ξ 1 is not proper, then by Theorem 1, there must exist an end component
Then, from C, player 2 can avoid reaching T ∪ W 2 by repeatedly applying a pure selector ξ 2 that at every state s ∈ C deterministically chooses a move a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s) such that Dest (s, ξ 1 , a 2 ) ⊆ C. The existence of a suitable ξ 2 (s) for all states s ∈ C follows from the definition of end component.
The following lemma shows that the selector that chooses all available moves uniformly at random is proper. This fact will be used later to initialize our strategyimprovement algorithm. , player 2 can ensure that the game does not leave C regardless of the moves chosen by player 1, and thus, for all strategies of player 1. This contradicts the fact that W 2 contains all states from which player 2 can ensure that T is not reached.
The following lemma shows that if the player-1 selector ζ k computed by the value-iteration scheme (1) is proper, then the player-1 strategy ζ k guarantees the value u k , for all k ≥ 0.
Lemma 3 Let v be a valuation such that
Proof. Consider an arbitrary player-2 strategy π 2 , and for
be the expected value of v after k steps under ξ 1 and π 2 . By induction on k, we can prove v k ≥ v for all k ≥ 0. In fact, v 0 = v, and for k ≥ 0, we have
For all k ≥ 0 and s ∈ S, we can write v k as
Since v(s) ≤ 1 when s ∈ T , the first term on the right-hand side is at most Pr
For the second term, we
is absorbing. Finally, the third term on the right hand side is 0, as v(s) = 0 for all states s ∈ W 2 . Hence, taking the limit with k → ∞, we obtain
where the last inequality follows from v k ≥ v for all k ≥ 0. The desired result follows.
From value iteration to optimal selectors
Considering again the value-iteration scheme (1), since 1 (Reach(T )) = lim k→∞ u k , for every ε > 0 there is a k such that u k (s) ≥ u k−1 (s) ≥ 1 (Reach(T ))(s) − ε at all states s ∈ S. Lemma 3 indicates that, in order to construct a memoryless ε-optimal strategy, we need to construct from u k−1 a player-1 selector ξ 1 such that:
1. ξ 1 is value-optimal for u k−1 , that is, P re 1:ξ1 (u k−1 ) = P re 1 (u k−1 ) = u k ; and 2. ξ 1 is proper.
To ensure the construction of a value-optimal, proper selector, we need some definitions. For r > 0, the value class
consists of the states with value r under the valuation u k .
Similarly we define U
, that is, the least iteration j in which the state s has the same value as in iteration k. For k ≥ 0, we define the player-1 selector η k as follows:
(this definition is arbitrary, and it does not affect the remainder of the proof). In words, the selector η k (s) is an optimal selector for s at the iteration k (s). It follows easily that u k = P re 1:η k (u k−1 ), that is, η k is also value-optimal for u k−1 , satisfying the first of the above conditions.
To conclude the construction, we need to prove that for k sufficiently large (namely, for k such that u k (s) > 0 at all states s ∈ S \ (T ∪ W 2 )), the selector η k is proper. To this end we use Theorem 1, and show that for sufficiently large k no end component of G η k is entirely contained in S \ (T ∪ W 2 ).
1 To reason about the end components of G η k , for a state s ∈ S and a player-2 move a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s), we write
for the set of possible successors of state s when player 1 follows the strategy η k , and player 2 chooses the move a 2 .
Lemma 4 Let 0 < r ≤ 1 and k ≥ 0, and consider a state s ∈ S \ (T ∪ W 2 ) such that s ∈ U k r . For all moves a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s), we have:
and there is a state
Proof. For convenience, let m = k (s), and consider any move a 2 ∈ Γ 2 (s).
• Consider first the case that Dest k (s, a 2 ) ⊆ U k r . Then, it cannot be that Dest k (s, a 2 ) ⊆ U k ≤r ; otherwise, for all states t ∈ Dest k (s, a 2 ), we would have u k (t) ≤ r, and there would be at least one state t ∈ Dest k (s, a 2 ) such that u k (t) < r, contradicting u k (s) = r and P re 1:
• Consider now the case that Dest k (s, a 2 ) ⊆ U k r . Since u m ≤ u k , due to the monotonicity of the P re 1 operator and (1), we have that u m−1 (t) ≤ r for all states
The above lemma states that under η k , from each state i ∈ U k r with r > 0 we are guaranteed a probability bounded away from 0 of either moving to a higher-value class U k >r , or of moving to states within the value class that have a strictly lower entry time. Note that the states in the target set T are all in U 0 1 : they have entry-time 0 in the value class for value 1. This implies that every state in S \ W 2 has a probability bounded above zero of reaching T in at most n = |S| steps, so that the probability of staying forever in S \ (T ∪ W 2 ) is 0. To prove this fact formally, we analyze the end components of G η k in light of Lemma 4.
Lemma 5 For all
Proof. Since every state s ∈ (T ∪W 2 ) is absorbing, to prove this result, in view of Corollary 1, it suffices to show that no end component of G η k is entirely contained in S \(T ∪W 2 ). Towards the contradiction, assume there is such an end component 
In both cases, we obtain a contradiction.
The above lemma shows that η k satisfies both requirements for optimal selectors spelt out at the beginning of Section 4.2. Hence, η k guarantees the value u k . This proves the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies for concurrent reachability games. 
Strategy Improvement
In the previous section, we provided a proof of the existence of memoryless ε-optimal strategies for all ε > 0, on the basis of a value-iteration scheme. In this section we present a strategy-improvement algorithm for concurrent games with reachability objectives. The algorithm will produce a sequence of selectors γ 0 , γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . for player 1, such that:
1. for all i ≥ 0, we have 1 γ i (Reach(T )) ≤ 1 γ i+1 (Reach(T ));
2. lim i→∞ 1 γ i (Reach(T )) = 1 (Reach(T )); and 3. if there is i ≥ 0 such that γ i = γ i+1 , then 1 γ i (Reach(T )) = 1 (Reach(T )).
Condition 1 guarantees that the algorithm computes a sequence of monotonically improving selectors. Condition 2 guarantees that the value guaranteed by the selectors converges to the value of the game, or equivalently, that for all ε > 0, there is a number i of iterations such that the memoryless player-1 strategy γ i is ε-optimal. Condition 3 guarantees that if a selector cannot be improved, then it is optimal. Note that for concurrent reachability games, there may be no i ≥ 0 such that γ i = γ i+1 , that is, the algorithm may fail to generate an optimal selector. This is because there are concurrent reachability games that do not admit optimal strategies, but only ε-optimal strategies for all ε > 0 [13, 9] . For turn-based reachability games, it can be easily seen that our algorithm terminates with an optimal selector. We note that the value-iteration scheme of the previous section does not directly yield a strategy-improvement algorithm. In fact, the sequence of player-1 selectors η 0 , η 1 , η 2 , . . . computed in Section 4.1 may violate Condition 3: it is possible that for some i ≥ 0 we have η i = η i+1 , but η i = η j for some j > i. This is because the scheme of Section 4.1 is fundamentally a value-iteration scheme,
